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We conduct a neutral-context laboratory experiment to systematically investigate the
role of the hit-by-bus concern in explaining the annuitization puzzle: the low rate
of retirement-asset annuitization relative to the predictions of standard models. We
vary endowed asset (annuity vs. stock of wealth vs. no explicit endowment), and nd
a strong endowment eect. Furthermore, we nd that the ordering of survival risks
matters. Compared to a frame in which a single draw from a known distribution
determines survival outcome, annuity choice is lower when subjects must sequentially
survive early periods to reach periods in which the annuity dominates. We conclude
with policy implications.
JEL Classication: C91, D14, D81, G22, J26
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1 Introduction
Private life annuities play a very small role in most households' retirement portfolios. Only
approximately 6% of U.S. elderly households receive income from private annuities, account-
ing for approximately 2% of total income.1 Their absence from retiree portfolios is surprising
given their theoretical welfare benets (Yaari 1965, Davido, Brown and Diamond 2005).
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1Data are from the Health and Retirement Study. Elderly households refer to households 65 years and
older. See Johnson, Burman and Kibes (2004) for more household-income composition details.
1This apparent annuity gap has lead to a large body of research, both empirical and theo-
retical, on the determinants of annuity choice. The evidence from over 35 years of inquiry
has identied a number of key factors suppressing annuity demand, most notably incom-
plete markets (for life annuity and long-term care insurance), bequest motives, and existing
annuities from Social Security and other sources. While there is growing consensus that
some combination of these factors largely accounts for the low observed demand among low-
wealth households, it remains dicult to reconcile fully the choices of high-lifetime-income
households with these fully rational models (Davido et al. 2005).
A growing body of evidence suggests that behavioral biases in
uence nancial decision
making. These biases plausibly aect the annuity decision, and thus might well be impor-
tant components of the remaining annuity gap (Brown 2007, p. 3). In this paper, we focus
on two biases plausibly underlying the commonly-expressed \hit by a bus" concern.2 First,
a retiree may be unduly reluctant to exchange her liquid-asset endowment for an annuity
(an endowment bias stemming from loss aversion). This bias may be particularly salient
with 401(k) participants focused on asset accumulation, and may partly explain why only
6 percent of 401(k) participants take retirement distribution as an annuity when given the
option.3 Second, she may give undue salience to the probability of dying early and, conse-
quently, to early utility comparisons for which a lump-sum likely dominates an annuity. We
evaluate the strength of these biases in a laboratory setting capturing many of the salient
features of the retiree's annuitization decision, and discuss their potential role in the wild.
The risk-ordering bias we investigate has not been previously studied to the best of our
knowledge. We believe it may stem from two sources. First, the retiree may focus on earlier
comparisons and risks because they are, well, earlier and perhaps more focal. Second, it may
also result from the compound, sequential nature of risks inherent in mortality. Surviving to
age 70 requires surviving age 69, which requires surviving age 68, and so forth. For perhaps
both reasons, when faced with this sequence of risks, it is our hypothesis that some place too
much salience on early-period utility comparisons over later-period comparisons. Note that
we do not assume that a retiree has incorrect beliefs about mortality rates, nor that she overly
discounts future utility. Rather, given her morality-rate beliefs and the discounted utility
for each option and for each retirement length, she is biased towards early comparisons.
The perfect-world case for annuitizing retirement assets is strong. Yaari (1965) and
2This concern is frequently identied by market surveys and anecdotal evidence as an important obstacle
to annuitization. In some surveys, a slightly dierent iteration is noted: that of dying soon after buying
an annuity and losing the principal to the insurance company. Potentially, loss of control or distrust of the
insurer might also be important deterrents. These latter two biases, however, are not considered in this
paper and remain to be explored.
3Note that only one in ve 401(k) plans even oer the option to take retirement distributions as an
annuity (Hewitt Associates 2005). Anecdotal evidence suggests that employers choose not to oer the option
because of low demand (Iwry and Turner Forthcoming).
2Davido et al. (2005) show that when faced with uncertain mortality, the retiree without
bequest motive ought to completely annuitize her assets to insure against outliving her
resources. By pooling risks and resources, annuities move funds from those states in which
the marginal utility of consumption is zero (i.e., after death) to those states in which it is
high (i.e., toward the end of a long retirement) and thus raise overall and expected utility.
Despite the potential gains, markets for non-mandated private annuities are thin. High
loads, at least somewhat due to adverse selection, certainly lower annuitization gains (Mitchell,
Poterba and Warshawsky 1999). However, actuarially unfair annuities do not completely
account for low rates of purchase. In simulations, Mitchell et al. (1999) nd that single
individuals should be willing to forego about a third of their wealth at age 65 to purchase
actuarially fair annuities, which is more than the then-estimated loads on annuities.4 In
fact, less than actuarially fair annuities could even be welfare enhancing for individuals with
higher than average mortality.5
A number of other factors reduce the amount of wealth optimally annuitized. Bequest mo-
tives (Friedman and Warshawsky 1990) increase the attractiveness of maintaining transfer-
able assets. Likewise, households anticipating long-term care expenses may rationally choose
to self-insure by holding liquidity (Sinclair and Smetters 2004, Turra and Mitchell 2004).6
Within marriage risk pooling (Kotliko and Spivak 1981) reduces the attractiveness of pri-
vate annuities (Brown and Poterba 2000) or at least argues for purchase delay (Dushi and
Webb 2004).
It is thus generally agreed that partial rather than full annuitization may be optimal given
incomplete or alternate annuity markets and bequests (Davido et al. 2005). Furthermore,
the majority of households receive annuity payments through Social Security. For low-earning
households, Social Security benets replace more than half of pre-retirement income.7 These
households are likely adequately annuitized.
However, Social Security replacement rates for medium and high-earning households
are lower. While many of these households receive additional annuity payments through
4Based on annuity prices in 1995, Mitchell et al. (1999) estimate the expected present discounted value
of annuity payments to be approximately 80-85 percent of the annuity premium (that is, a load factor of
15-20 percent), with approximately one-half of the load attributable to adverse selection.
5In utility-based terms, Gong and Webb (2006) nd that even accounting for pre-annuitized wealth and
longevity risk-sharing within marriage, the average black, white and hispanic households would benet from
annuitization, although the estimated benets to the average hispanic and black households are small. Earlier
work by Brown (2003) estimated much larger benets for those with higher than average mortality, but did
not account for pre-existing annuities and risk-sharing from marriage.
6Late life medical expenses can be large (De Nardi, French and Jones 2006) and the market for long-term
care insurance is incomplete (Finkelstein and McGarry 2006).
7The 2007 Social Security Trustees Report estimates replacement rates of 56 percent for low earners,
42 percent for medium earners, 35 percent for high earners, and 29 for steady maximum earners, under
intermediate assumptions about demographic and economic growth (Social Security Administration 2007).
3dened-benet (DB) plans, Dushi and Webb (2004) estimate that the optimal degree of
annuitization is quite high. Wealthier households (who have lower mortality and lower pre-
existing annuity income) and single individuals (who cannot benet from intra-household risk
pooling), particularly women, could likely gain from additional annuitization at retirement.8
The decline of DB pensions and the shift to 401(k)-type dened contribution (DC) re-
tirement plans could arguably increase the annuity gap for future retirees. Dushi and Webb
(2004) estimate that the capitalized value of DB pension payments accounts for 20 percent
of total wealth for the median retiree in 2000 whereas total DC assets account for merely 2
percent of the total. This ratio is projected to shift dramatically over time as more work-
ers are covered by and contribute longer to DC accounts. Poterba, Venti and Wise (2007)
project the ratio to decline to 0.1 or 0.15 by 2040.9 While demand for private annuities
among 401(k) participants may possibly increase as a result, the evidence to date suggests
that any increase would like fall short of reaching current pre-annuitized levels.10 The need
to fully understand the annuity decision is more important than ever.
Biases such as hyperbolic discounting, loss aversion, mental accounting and those arising
from the frame of reference have been shown to aect saving, investment and other nancial
decisions, and are suggested to explain anomalies in nancial decision-making.11 Hu and
Scott (2007) argue that well documented behavioral biases may plausibly contribute to low
rates of retiree annuitization. Recent survey (Brown, Kling, Mullainathan and Wrobel 2008a,
Brown, Kling, Mullainathan, Wiens and Wrobel 2008b) and experimental (Agnew, Anderson,
Gerlach and Szykman 2008) studies nd that framing has potentially important eects on
annuity valuation and may explain, to some extent, why the market for private annuities is
much thinner than expected given standard assumptions.
In this study, we conducted a laboratory experiment to systematically investigate the
roles of endowment and risk-ordering biases. A retiree may be averse to exchanging the
lump sum in her retirement account for a stream of payments. Attaching ownership to her
endowed stock of wealth, she willingly forgoes some annuitization gains in order to ensure
that she does not lose her endowment.12 We therefore compare annuity-choice likelihood
as we vary the denomination of experimental retirement assets. Subjects either a) earn a
8Milevsky and Young (2007) also show that for a given level of pre-existing annuity income, if partial
annuitization is available, individuals who are more risk-averse or who have lower pre-annuitized wealth
would nd immediate annuitization attractive.
9The 401(k) projections assume historical equity returns less 300 basis points. DC account balances would
be lower and, thus, the ratio would be higher if projections account for cashouts, portfolio re-balancing, and
administrative costs.
10Declines in Social Security benets and increasing Medicare premiums will further contribute to the
decline in pre-existing annuitized wealth (Munnell 2003).
11See Barberis and Thaler (2002), Benartzi and Thaler (1995), and Benartzi and Thaler (2007).
12We do not in this study consider alternative endowment-eect causes, such as transaction costs associated
with evaluating and carrying out a trade.
4401(k)-like account balance; b) earn a claim on annuity-like payment stream; or c) are not
explicitly endowed with either option.
We further note that the possibility of principal loss from an early death confronts the
consumer when evaluating the annuity. The placing of too much weight on the probability of
dying early (more than is warranted by actual probabilities) relative to the probability of a
long retirement decreases the perceived relative value of the annuity. To test for the presence
of this risk-ordering bias in a retirement-like decision, we compare annuity choice in a frame
in which subjects must survive earlier periods to reach later ones (the Sequential frame)
to a frame in which we remove the sequential ordering of risks (the Simultaneous frame)
by resolving all retirement-length uncertainty with a single draw from a known probability
distribution.
We nd that subjects in Sequential sessions are less likely to select the annuity-like option
than subjects in Simultaneous sessions. We also nd that when earned assets are denoted
as a lump-sum, subjects are less likely to select the annuity-like option relative to the no
endowment session. Furthermore, when earned assets are denoted as a stream of payments,
subjects are more likely to select the annuity-like option relative to the lump-sum session.
The extent to which behavioral biases contribute to any annuity gap has implications on
the eectiveness of proposed policy interventions. For instance, a proposed x for an endow-
ment bias in 401(k) plans is to change the denomination of DC assets: instead of specifying
balances as a lump sum, specify them as a claim on a stream of payments. Assigning owner-
ship to the stream of payments rather than the lump sum may well deter retirees from taking
their retirement assets as a lump sum. Results from this experiment indicate that endow-
ment eects are present when subjects have to make annuity-like decisions in the laboratory.
While acknowledging the many dierences (both in context and stakes) between the decision
facing experiment subjects and that of the retiree, we do believe these results suggest that
such a policy intervention might increase the proportion of annuitized retirement assets.
2 Experiment Design
In the real world, the decision to annuitize retirement wealth is not a binary decision. A
retiree may choose to annuitize only a fraction of her wealth, and has some 
exibility in
purchase timing. In order to focus on the behavioral aspects of the annuitization decision,
we consider the simplest case: at the time of retirement, a retiree must choose either a stock
of wealth out of which she can consume or a life annuity.
This relatively straightforward decision highlights an inherent tradeo faced by a retiree
with a rational attachment to maintaining a lump-sum of (somewhat) liquid assets (e.g., a
bequest motive). Should she die early in her retirement, maintaining the lump sum delivers
5higher utility due to bequest value and (likely) higher consumption utility in those early
years. However, should she live many years, the annuity delivers higher overall utility as risk
pooling allows higher later-year consumption possibilities.
In the laboratory, we oered subjects a payout-option choice analogous to the retiree's
choice between the utility outcomes available under full annuitization and those available as
a result of the optimal consumption out of a stock of wealth. When choosing between payout
options, subjects had a table indicating for each option (lump sum or annuity) the payment
for each retirement length. Subjects knew the process for retirement-length determination.
The Payout Phase of the experiment (i.e., retirement) lasted from 1 to 15 rounds, with each
event (retirement length) equilikely. To foster comprehension of experiment instructions,
subjects completed a series of incentivized review questions.
To test our hypotheses, we varied conditions not aecting choices under the expected-
utility-maximization assumption. In one dimension, we varied endowed asset type. In some
sessions we endowed subjects with the annuity payout option, in some the lump-sum payout
option, and in the nal set of session we did not endow them with either option. In the second
dimension, we varied the manner of resolving retirement-length uncertainty. In one set of
sessions, we determined retirement length by sequential survival, thus making clear that the
risk of an early post-annuitization death preceded that of low consumption toward the end of
a long, non-annuitized, retirement. In a second set of sessions, a single draw from a known
distribution determined retirement length. We made no mention of periods. Therefore,
outcome determination was a single event as opposed to a string of events. Sessions in which
subjects faced sequential survival endowed with a lump-sum of assets mimic the current
401(k) frame of reference.
We used a neutral context in the laboratory, avoiding language such as retirement, be-
quests and death. In Section 5, we discuss the relative merits of this choice.
2.1 Payout Options
Payout tables captured the inherent trade-o in the annuitization decision.13 The lump-sum's
declining per-round payment mimics the declining consumption path generally optimal for
consumption out of a stock of wealth. The annuity delivered a constant payment path. The
lump-sum option paid more in the event of a short retirement, less in a long retirement, and
had a lower expected payout.
We attempted to minimize inter-treatment payout-table dierences. Tables listed a pay-
ment corresponding to consumption utility (the Type-I payment in the Instructions and
Payo Table) and a payment corresponding to bequest utility (the Type-II payment) for
13In Appendix A, we provide details on how we arrived at payout values.
6both annuity and lump-sum. As we assumed complete annuitization for the annuity option,
the Type-II (i.e. bequest) payments for this option were always zero. A subject choosing
the lump sum started with an account from which Type-I payments were made.14 After
a subject's nal round, she received a Type-II payment equal to a fraction of the amount
remaining in her account after subtracting Type-I payments received. We include sample
experiment instructions and Payout Tables in Appendix B.
We did not allow the subject choosing the lump-sum option to actually choose per-period
consumption. First, simplifying the subject's decision problem allows us to focus on the
behavioral hypotheses of interest. Given the complexity of the problem and the limited time
to optimize, a subject may make serious mistakes in her allocation. If this subject chose the
annuity, we would not know whether it is because she preferred the annuity's consumption
path to the lump sum's or whether she miscalculated the latter's utility possibilities. Second,
the subject choosing the annuity would make many fewer decisions than the subject choosing























Annuity: Payouts A Lump Sum: Payouts A
Annuity: Payouts B Lump Sum: Payouts B
Figure 1: Payment to subject surviving exactly a given number of rounds under Payouts A and
B in sessions where endowments are not earned.
As a rst step towards establishing the robustness of our results, we used two sets of
payouts: Payouts A and Payouts B. Under Payouts A, the expected payo from the lump-
sum option is 88% of the annuity's. The dierence in the maximal payos was also rather
large, with the lump sum's maximal payment only 60% of the annuity's. We made expected
payos in Payouts B more equal (the lump-sum's expected payout is 97% of the annuity's)
and the dierence in maximal payos smaller (lump-sum's maximal payo is almost 70% of
annuity's). We show in Figure 1 the base payment schedule for each payout option under both
14In those sessions in which the default option is the Lump-Sum Payout option, we referred to the account
as their account.
7Payouts A and B. While we required subjects to earn endowments in some sessions and thus
introduced some endowment heterogeneity, the payout options were always a proportional
rescaling of either Payouts A or B.
2.2 Experiment Treatments
In one dimension, we varied the denomination of retirement assets. In No Endowment
sessions, we did not endow subjects with a particular payout option|we simply asked them
to choose between the Annuity and Lump-Sum payout options. In the other two sets of ses-
sions, a subject was endowed with either the annuity payout path (Annuity Endowment)
or the lump-sum payout path (Lump-Sum Endowment). We then asked the subject, in
essence, whether she would like to trade for the other payout path.
Previous experiments have found that hypothetical endowments are not always sucient
to induce an endowment eect. Just as the real-world retiree earns her retirement assets,
subjects earned retirement assets by performing a timed memory task (the Earnings Phase
in the Instructions).15 We translated points accumulated in the memory task into Payout-
Phase assets, reported as either a per-round annuity payment (akin to the Social Security
statement we receive each year) or a stock of wealth (akin to the 401(k) statement we receive
each quarter). The idea is that retirees and subjects may develop a sense of ownership over
the type of asset when they have earned the underlying asset. To further foster a sense
of ownership, we split the Earnings Phase into two four-minute periods, and reported the
current and projected per-round payment (in the Annuity sessions) or account balance (in
the Lump-Sum sessions) between earning periods.
While subjects earning n points in either earned-endowment treatment received the same
payout table, tables varied according to Earnings-Phase points. A concave function from
points into payouts mitigated inter-subject endowment variation. We attempted to control
for inter-treatment variation by parameterizing so that the expected earned endowment
equaled that of the No Endowment sessions. Prior to the Earnings Phase, subjects received
a table indicating, for a range of points earned, either the per-round payment (Annuity
Endowment sessions) or account balance (Lump-Sum Endowment sessions).
After the Earnings Phase, we oered subjects the alternate payout option. We did not
further favor the initially endowed option. A subject earning an $18 account balance or the
equivalent per-round payment received the exact same choice sheet as a subject in a No
Endowment session.
In the second dimension, we varied the determination of the number of Payout-Phase
15A subject's monitor displayed ve letters. She clicked okay after reviewing the letters and was presented
with three letters. The subject then indicated whether all of the three letters were in the original ve. Points
earned equalled the number of correct responses minus the number of incorrect responses.
8rounds (i.e., retirement length). In Simultaneous sessions, a single draw from a bag con-
taining 15 lettered chips determined retirement length. There was no mention of time or
rounds. We identied retirement lengths as Events A, B, ..., O, with Event A corresponding
to a one-round Payout Phase.16
In Sequential I sessions, sequential survival determined retirement length.17 In each
Payout-Phase round, the subject drew a marble from a bag of marbles to determine survival
into the next round. If she drew a green marble in round t, she received the round t + 1
consumption (Type-I) payment and then drew another marble to determine survival into
round t + 2. If she drew a red marble in round t, her Payout Phase ended and she collected
no more per-round payments, but she did receive the round t bequest (Type-II) payment if
she had chosen the lump-sum option. The bag contained 14 green marbles and 1 red marble
in round 1. In each subsequent round (until she pulled a red ball), the bag contained one
fewer green marble than in the preceding round.
There was no dierence in survival probabilities across treatments. For example, both
Event G in the Simultaneous treatment and surviving exactly 7 periods in a Sequential
treatment occurred with probability 1
15 and had the same subject payo (conditional on
having the same level of retirement assets). However, in the Sequential treatments, she
only reached those states in which the annuity dominated by rst surviving those states in
which the lump sum dominated. If in fact the ordering of risks matters in the manner we
hypothesize, we should nd lower annuitization rates in Sequential treatments.
In Sequential I sessions, we presented the probability of surviving to the next period
conditional on survival to the current period, but not the unconditional probability of sur-
viving a given number of periods. While a subject in a Simultaneous session knew that the
probability of Event G was 1
15, a subject in a Sequential I session might not have known
that she had this chance of surviving exactly 7 periods. While a lower rate of annuitization
in Sequential I may be due to early events having more salience, it may also be due to an
inability to calculate unconditional probabilities. To rule out this possibility, we conducted
Sequential II sessions identical to Sequential I sessions except that we provided both con-
ditional and unconditional probabilities. In all Sequential II sessions, we did not explicitly
endow subjects with either option, and thus subjects did not need to earn endowments.18
16By listing outcomes associated with an early death rst, we potentially introduce a bias. This bias
ought to work in the same direction as the ordering bias, and thus works against nding a dierence between
treatments.
17Fatas, Lacomba and Lagos (2007) used a similar method to determine retirement length in their inves-
tigation of retirement timing.
18Nonetheless, we administered the timed memory task to these subjects after they had made their choices.




























Earned Endomwent Sessions Only
All Sessions
and Review
Figure 2: Summary and timeline of session events. We list events occurring in all sessions above
the timeline, and those occurring only in Earned-Endowment sessions below.
The main procedural dierence between treatments was the need for subjects in the
earned-endowment sessions to earn payout-phase assets. We present in Figure 2 a summary
and timeline of session events.
After all subjects made the choice of payout option, each subject completed a Holt-Laury
risk-aversion assessment (Holt and Laury 2002) further described in section 4.2. Subjects
also completed a demographic questionnaire, and answered incentivized review questions
before both the payout-option choice and the risk-aversion assessment.
Simultaneous Sequential I Sequential II Total
27 Payout A 26 Payout A 32 Payout A 85 Payout A
No Endowment 28 Payout B 25 Payout B 28 Payout B 81 Payout B
55 Total 51 Total 60 Total 166 Total
26 Payout A 25 Payout A 51 Payout A
Lump Sum Endowment 22 Payout B 24 Payout B 46 Payout B
48 Total 49 Total 97 Total
29 Payout A 28 Payout A 57 Payout A
Annuity Endowment 28 Payout B 25 Payout B 53 Payout B
57 Total 53 Total 110 Total
82 Payout A 79 Payout A 32 Payout A 193 Payout A
TOTAL 78 Payout B 74 Payout B 28 Payout B 180 Payout B
160 Total 153 Total 60 Total 373 Total
Table 1: Number of subjects in each treatment.
10We conducted sessions at George Mason University's ICES laboratory in September and
October 2008 and February 2009. Approximately 14 subjects participated in a session,
without duplication. Table 1 details the treatments and subject participation in this study.
Participants were George Mason University students. Parts of the experiment (the Earnings
Phase and the quizzes) were programmed and conducted with z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007). The
No Endowment sessions lasted approximately 60{75 minutes, whereas earned-endowment
sessions lasted approximately 75{90 minutes. The average payo was about $23.45, including
a $7 show-up fee.
3 Hypotheses
Given uncertainty over outcomes, the unbiased subject chooses the payout option with the
greater expected utility. While it is plausible that a retiree's per-period utility depends
on only per-period consumption, a subject likely evaluates session earnings. Let x
j
t be the
Type-I (consumption) payment and b
j
t be the Type-II (bequest) payment for payout option
j in round t. With pt the probability of surviving to at least round t and dt the probability








































t = 0 for all t. Equation 1 expresses an option's expected utility in terms of the
probability the Payout Phase lasts exactly t rounds and the total payment if that is the case
(y
j





), a subject chooses the annuity option if i  0.
We rst suppose that following Cumulative Prospect Theory (Tversky and Kahneman
1992), the weights that a subject assigns to dierent outcomes, ~ , may deviate from actual

































particular, we make the following assumption about decision weights in our treatments.









for 0 < t <  t < 15, with
P15
=1  = 1. In the Simultaneous treatments, ~  = ~ d.
Subject payments for the lump-sum option are greater than those for the annuity option
if the Payout Phase lasts fewer than 7 rounds under Payouts A (8 rounds under Payouts B).




< i. This leads
to the following hypotheses concerning the eect of probability framing.
Hypothesis 1. For each endowment frame, the proportion of subjects choosing the annuity
payout option will be greater in the Simultaneous treatment than in the Sequential treatment.
We next suppose, once again following (Cumulative) Prospect Theory, that a subject
evaluates uncertain outcomes relative to her initial endowment: v(yj). Given this value




























, with J = fan;lsg. Endowed with the annuity option,




 0, and if endowed with the lump-sum option,





In the spirit of Prospect Theory, we make the following assumption about the value
function:
Assumption 2. Endowed with option j, the value function v():




t (i.e., over losses relative to endowment);




t (i.e., over gains relative to endowment);














relationship will hold when ~  = ~ d. This leads to the following hypothesis comparing choices
across payout-option endowments.
Hypothesis 2. For each probability frame, the proportion of subjects choosing the annuity
payout option will be greater in the Annuity Endowment treatment than in the Lump-Sum
treatment.
12While equation (1) is the appropriate expression for the expected utility of the experiment
subject, it is not appropriate for the retiree. Under the assumptions specied in Appendix


























t = 0 for all t. Under our assumptions, the rational retiree always chooses to annu-
itize, although this prediction is highly dependent on the strength of the rational attraction
to maintaining a stock of liquid wealth (the bequest motive in our model). We do note that
under Assumptions 1 and 2, the hypotheses remain unchanged for a population of retirees







































SIM SEQ I SIM SEQ II SIM SEQ I SEQ II
Lump Sum Endowment     Annuity Endowment                 No Endowment           
Figure 3: Proportion of subjects choosing annuity, by treatment, with standard error bars.
In Figure 3, we depict for each treatment the proportion of subjects choosing the annuity
payout option. A few observations are evident. First, in all treatments, a signicant propor-
tion of subjects chose the annuity option. Second, the ordering of risks seems to matter in the
hypothesized direction. Regardless of endowment, annuity choice is likelier in Simultaneous
treatment than in the Sequential treatment. Third, Figure 3 suggests an endowment eect,
as the proportion of subjects choosing the annuity payout option is smallest when endowed
with the lump-sum payout option.
13Probability Annuity Choice 2 Test
Endowment Frame Proportion H0 p-value
No Endowment Simultaneous 83.6% NoE:Sim=NoE:Seq I 0.069
Sequential I 68.6% NoE:Seq I=NoE:Seq II 0.558
Sequential II 63.3% NoE:Sim=NoE:Seq II 0.014
Lump Sum Simultaneous 64.6% LS:Sim=LS:Seq I 0.584
Sequential I 59.2% LS:Sim=Ann:Sim 0.037
Annuity Simultaneous 82.5% Ann:Sim=Ann:Seq I 0.368
Sequential I 75.5% LS:Seq I=Ann:Seq I 0.079
Table 2: Annuity choice proportions by treatment and 2 test results.
4.1 Hypothesis Testing
We present in Table 2 the proportion of subjects choosing the annuity payout option by
treatment. We also note for each null hypothesis the p-value of the 2 test. We now formally
test our hypotheses.
Result 1. The proportion of subjects choosing the annuity payout option is greater in the
Simultaneous treatment than in the Sequential treatment when subjects are not explicitly
endowed with a payout option. The same dierence is not signicant when subjects are
explicitly endowed with a payout option.
Support: We present in the nal column of Table 2 the p-values for the 2 test of the null
hypotheses of equal proportions.
Result 1 is consistent with an ordering of risks aecting decision making. In the No
Endowment treatment, we can reject the hypotheses of annuity-choice equality at the 10%
level of signicance when comparing Simultaneous to Sequential I, and at the 5% level com-
paring it to Sequential II.19 While annuity-choice proportion is greater in the Simultaneous
frames than the Sequential in the earned-endowment treatments, we cannot reject the null
of equality of proportions.
Result 2. The proportion of subjects choosing the annuity payout option when endowed with
the annuity payout option is greater than the proportion when endowed with the lump-sum
option regardless of probability frame (Sequential or Simultaneous).
Support: We present in the nal column of Table 2 the p-values for the 2 test of the null
hypotheses of equal proportions.
19We cannot reject the hypothesis of Sequential I versus II annuity-choice equality. Pooling these two
treatments and comparing with Simultaneous, we reject the hypothesis of annuity-choice equality (p = 0:016).
14Result 2 suggests a fairly strong endowment eect in decisions akin to asset allocation
in retirement. When there is no temporal ordering of retirement risks (Simultaneous), we
reject the null hypotheses of proportion equality at the 5% level of signicance, and reject
the corresponding null hypotheses at the 10% level of signicance when retirement risks are
temporally ordered (Sequential I).
4.2 Regression Analysis
While treatments were randomly assigned to experiment sessions, subject characteristics
could very well vary across sessions. These inter-treatment dierences in subject character-
istics could potentially exaggerate or understate dierences attributable to treatment eects.
Importantly, we ought to control for risk preferences. We based payout tables on the
utility paths oered by the options. However, while the expected-utility-maximizing retiree
cares only about expected utilities and not their variances, the subject cares about payment
variance unless risk neutral. In evaluating the range of potential outcomes for each option, a
subject's risk aversion aects her choice. Therefore inter-treatment risk-preference dierences
could drive some of the Table 2 treatment dierences.
We elicited an ordinal measure of risk preferences (Holt and Laury 2002). For each of
10 decisions, a subject chose between a safe option (where \Left" pays $2.00 and \Right"
$1.60) and a risky option (where \Left" pays $3.85 and \Right" $0.10). The probability of
left linearly increased from 1/10 in decision one to 10/10 in decision ten. We dene the HL
Score as the decision number the subject rst chose the risky option. We treat as missing
the nearly 20% of subjects who switched back and forth multiple times between the riskier
and safer option. As the probability of the good outcome (Left) increased monotonically
from decision one to ten, consistency dictates only one switch from safe to risky option (or
the same option for all decisions).20
As we presented subjects one of two sets of payout schedules, we do not use the Scores
directly in our regression analysis. Instead, we construct an indicator equal to one if the
expected-utility-maximizing subject would have selected the annuity given her HL Score.
To construct this variable, we solve for the range of risk preferences consistent with each
HL Score assuming CRRA utility. We also compute the level of risk preference consistent
with indierence between the annuity and lump-sum option for a given payout table (that
is, Payout A or B). With these two pieces of information, we identify those subjects who
should prefer the annuity option.
Just as inter-treatment heterogeneity in risk preferences may account for treatment dier-
ences, so may dierences in other dimensions. In Table 3, we present subject characteristics
20To increase our non-missing sample, we retained 26 observations in which there was only one \stray"
choice among a consistent pattern of choices.
15No Endowments
Total Endowment Annuity Lump-Sum
Obs. SIM SEQ(1) SIM SEQ SIM SEQ
Mean Risk (Holt-Laury) Score 303 6.41 7.25 6.57 6.46 6.54 6.68
Prop. in Prefer Annuity Range 303 0.51 0.42 0.41 0.48 0.49 0.57
Prop. with Missing HL Scores 373 0.25 0.18 0.14 0.13 0.19 0.24
Prop. Took Review Questions 373 0.78 0.70 1.00 0.72 1.00 1.00
Prop. Received Payouts B(2) 373 0.51 0.48 0.49 0.47 0.46 0.49
Points Earned 207 n.a. n.a. 85.63 79.32 77.52 76.65
(Std Dev) (21.25) (21.75) (20.80) (20.10)
Male 350 0.75 0.62 0.70 0.74 0.67 0.53
Born in the US(3) 348 0.47 0.40 0.47 0.47 0.44 0.61
Mean Age 347 21.46 21.60 21.42 21.41 21.69 21.36
Graduate Student 373 0.36 0.41 0.33 0.42 0.38 0.33
Working for Pay 362 0.57 0.49 0.67 0.61 0.91 0.65
Ever Taken Calculus 357 0.87 0.82 0.84 0.90 0.75 0.92
Ever Taken Trigonometry 357 0.91 0.89 0.86 0.92 0.87 0.92
Ever Taken Statistics 364 0.69 0.70 0.82 0.72 0.77 0.75
Notes:
(1) Includes 60 SEQ II subjects. Group's mean Points Earned is 76.07, with a std dev of 20.09.
(2) Payouts B has smaller dierences in expected and maximal payos than Payout A.
(3) 60% of foreign born are graduate students compared to 6% of US born.
Table 3: Inter-Treatment Heterogeneity.
across treatment groups. In addition to inter-treatment dierences in risk preferences, we
present other subject characteristics|such as age, education background, cognitive abilities,
and U.S. nativity| plausibly aecting the valuation of the annuity relative to the lump sum.
For example, a subject's math background may provide information about ability to com-
pute expected values, and ability to comprehend experiment instructions may be correlated
with U.S. nativity.
We make a few observations. First, the proportion of subjects with HL Scores in the
range that should prefer the annuity varies substantially across treatments. This proportion
in the Lump-Sum treatment (in both Sequential and Simultaneous frames) is greater than
in either the Annuity or the No Endowment treatment. This dierence likely understates
the eect of the Lump-Sum treatment on annuity choice. Likewise, in both the Annuity
and Lump-Sum frames, the proportion of subjects in the prefer-annuity range is greater in
16Figure 4: CDFs of Earned and Imputed Memory Task Points.
Sequential sessions than in Simultaneous sessions. Again, this dierence likely understates
the eect of the Sequential treatment on annuity choice in those frames.
Second, we observe inter-treatment dierences in memory-task points earned. Points in
Sequential sessions were signicantly lower than in Simultaneous sessions, and signicantly
lower in Lump-Sum than in Annuity sessions. Inter-treatment point dierences may be
important if performance in the memory task measures a dimension of cognitive abilities
aecting annuity choice.
Third, about 15% of subjects, concentrated in the No Endowment sessions, did not answer
experiment-instruction review questions. We did not administer these questions in the rst
sessions we ran. This inter-treatment dierence could plausibly contribute to systematic
dierences across treatments in annuity choice.
Fourth, across treatments, subjects vary in gender, U.S. nativity, and educational back-
ground. However, there does not appear to be a clear pattern across treatments that would
systematically bias the measured treatment eect in one direction or the other.
Fifth, we code as missing HL Scores for a reasonably large proportion of subjects. This
proportion varies across treatments. Although we hold no priors that suggest subjects with
missing scores would systematically behave dierently from their counterparts with non-
missing scores, the possibility exists.
Finally, points earned are missing for most subjects the No Endowment sessions. This
was by construction since subjects in these sessions received, rather than earned, their en-
17dowments. Given the wide distribution of points earned and the possibility that the variable
absorbs important inter-treatment variation in cognitive dierences (not absorbed by the
other demographic variables), we impute for missing points earned.21 We use a multiple
imputation hot-deck method.22 Hot-deck imputation preserves the distribution of points
earned, while multiple imputations introduce variability, generating larger (better) standard
error estimates than a single imputation.23 In Figure 4, we show the cumulative distributions
of imputed and actual points earned.
We now turn to regression evidence of treatment eects, controlling for inter-treatment
heterogeneity. We characterize annuity choice with an underlying latent process. From
















 0. Correspondingly, we have
Pr(Yi = 1jXi;Zi) = (xXi + zZi); (4)
with Xi a vector of treatment indicator variables and Zi a vector of control variables. The
treatment vector includes indicator variables for Sequential, No Endowment, and Annuity
Endowment sessions. The omitted categories are Simultaneous and Lump-Sum.
The vector of coecients x, reporting our treatment eects, is the coecient vector
of interest. If the manner in which we resolve uncertainty aects the annuity decision, we
expect the coecient on Sequential to be 1 < 0. If endowed asset type aects the annuity
decision, we expect 2 > 0 (for the No Endowment treatment) and 3 > 0 (for the Annuity
treatment).
To account for inter-treatment dierences in observable characteristics and experiment
setup, we incrementally include control variables in the probit model. In all, we account
for risk preferences (proxied by the indicator for whether the subject's risk-aversion level
is consistent with choosing the annuity), cognitive dierences (proxied by points earned), a
parsimonious set of demographic controls given the relatively small sample size, an indicator
for whether the subject took the review questions, and relative payouts (by including a
indicator if she faced Payouts B). The full sample includes 373 observations. Our sample
size decreases when we add additional controls due to missing data.
Of course, the controls enable us to parse out the eects of observable characteristics
21In later No Endowment sessions (60 subjects), we administered an incentivized memory-task phase after
the risk-aversion assessment.
22It is reasonable to assume data are missing at random. There is no systematic organization of treatments
in terms of session date or time, and recruitment emails do not dier across treatments.
23The standard errors from multiple imputations are constructed using the between- and within-imputation
variation (Rubin 1987). We generate 10 complete imputed data sets due to the high missing rate. Due to
relatively small cell sizes, we limit predictors for imputing to two: gender and U.S. nativity.
18from treatment eects. Unobservable factors may in
uence annuity choice.24 As the vector
x captures changes in choice probability relative to the omitted case, so long as these
unobservable eects do not vary systematically across treatments (i.e., they are uncorrelated
with the treatment variables), any randomly distributed unobserved eect will be dierenced
out.
In Table 4, we report the coecients we estimate for six regression models, reporting
marginal estimates (evaluated at the mean). In model one, our base estimate of treatment
eects, we estimate a probit equation with only treatment dummies. In the second model,
we include the risk-preference proxy whose distribution may lead to model one understating
treatment eects. In model three, we add the demographic and experimental setup controls
which may aect annuity choice: age and indicators for U.S. nativity, taken calculus, review
questions, and Payouts B. In model four, we account for dierences in points earned (using
imputed values for the No Endowment sessions), which potentially proxies for cognitive
dierences.25 We include the points earned and its squared term. In our fth model, we
account for possible selection by including subjects with missing HL scores. An indicator
variable, set to 1, identies missing HL scores. In our nal model, we focus on earned-
endowment sessions only.
There are four important points to take away from the results. First, subjects in the Se-
quential treatment are at least 10 percentage points less likely to choose the annuity option
than subjects in Simultaneous treatment. This result is robust across all six specications.
Comparing estimates for models (1) and (2), the inclusion of the risk-preference proxy sub-
stantially increases the estimated eect of Sequential frame on annuity choice: from -11.3
percentage points to -15.3 percentage points. The eect remains with the inclusion of demo-
graphic and cognitive controls. Not surprisingly, accounting for missing HL scores reduced
the magnitude of the estimated coecient on the treatment variables. To the extent that
subjects who had diculty comprehending the HL risk assessment also had diculty compre-
hending the annuity choice, we would not expect to observe a systematic pattern in annuity
choice. Although our results are robust even with the inclusion of missing HL scores, our
preferred specication would exclude those cases.
Second, subjects in both the No Endowment and Annuity Treatments are more likely to
choose the annuity option than subjects in the Lump-Sum treatment. The estimated eect
is large, signicant and robust across all six specications. The annuity-choice probability
dierence between the Annuity and Lump-Sum treatments is generally larger then the corre-
sponding dierence between the No Endowment and Lump-Sum treatments. In the Annuity
24For example, a subject may focus only on round 15 Total Payments.
25We were unable to impute Earned Points for all subjects in the No Endowment sessions due to missing
demographic values in the donor (predictor) pool.
19(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
dy/dx dy/dx dy/dx dy/dx dy/dx dy/dx
Treatments
Sequential I -0.113** -0.153*** -0.137** -0.154*** -0.096* -0.188**
(0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.08)
No Endowment 0.111** 0.112* 0.145** 0.161** 0.182**
(0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
Annuity Endowment 0.159*** 0.195*** 0.190*** 0.190*** 0.158** 0.163**
(0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07)
Risk Preferences
Should Prefer Annuity 0.136*** 0.139** 0.144** 0.115* 0.109
(0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.08)
Environment
Payouts B -0.008 0.017 -0.058 -0.075
(0.07) (0.07) (0.06) (0.08)
Sequential II -0.061 -0.042 -0.095
(0.09) (0.09) (0.09)
Other Controls
Demographic no no yes yes yes yes
Imputed Earned Points no no no yes yes n.a.
Missing HL Indicator no no no no yes no
Observations 373 303 291 279 344 158
LR 2 13.1 23.3 26.8 28.1 25.4 18.7
Prob> 2 0.004 0.000 0.003 0.003 0.013 0.009
Notes: dy/dx is for a discrete change of indicator variable from 0 to 1. Signicant at: *
10-percent level; ** 5-percent level; *** 1-percent level. Standard errors in parenthesis.
Omitted groups are Simultaneous and Lump-Sum Endowment. HL Scores refer to Holt-
Laury risk assessment scores, and Should Prefer Annuity is based on HL Score and Payouts
A vs. B. Payouts B has smaller dierence in expected total payment and maximal payo
than A. Imputed earned points include the main and squared terms. Sequential II was only
administered in the No Endowment frames. Demographic controls: age, US born, ever taken
calculus. Missing demographic variables reduce sample sizes in models (3-6).
Table 4: Probit Estimates: Marginal Eects of Sequential and Endowment Treatments on Annuity
Choice.
vs. Lump Sum comparison, accounting for risk preferences increases the estimated eect of
the endowment bias whereas accounting for selection absorbs some of the dierence. In the
No Endowment vs. Lump Sum comparison, the eect strengthens with additional controls.
Third, recall that based on the chi-square test, we could not reject the hypothesis of
20equality of annuity-choice proportions between Sequential and Simultaneous frames when
subjects earned a particular payout option. This is not the case after accounting for risk
preferences. Model six includes only subjects in earned-endowment sessions. Our speci-
cation includes only those who had valid HL scores for the reasons discussed above. We
estimate that those receiving the Sequential treatment were nearly 19 percentage points
more likely to choose the annuity option than subjects in the Simultaneous treatment. Fur-
thermore, when endowments were denominated as an annuity, subjects were 16 percentage
points more likely to choose the annuity option than when denominated as a Lump-Sum.26
Finally, our specication-check variables assure us that neither maximal payos or the in-
ability to compute unconditional probabilities are driving our results. We varied the expected
total payment and maximal payo between the annuity and lump-sum options (Payouts A
vs. B) in case these comparisons contributed to treatment dierences. We also varied whether
we included unconditional probabilities in the payout table in Sequential treatments (Sequen-
tial I vs II), in case choices were largely driven by mistakes computing survival probabilities.
Neither appear to be signicant in the annuity-choice decision.
5 Discussion
Since Yaari's (1965) seminal work, a large literature has attempted to explain why observed
annuitization rates are lower than generally predicted under standard neoclassical models.
Even accounting for factors such as pre-existing annuities, bequest motives, and precau-
tionary saving for uninsured late-life medical expenses, these models are generally unable
to explain fully the gap. Recent evidence suggests that frame-induced biases may provide
additional traction in explaining the annuity decision. We contribute to this line of inquiry,
focusing on the oft-expressed concern of dying shortly after annuity purchase. We break this
concern down into two plausible behavioral biases. Our rst hypothesis is a risk-ordering
bias: retirees eectively overweight the early risk (an early death) relative to the later risk
(a longer-than-anticipated retirement). Our second hypothesis is an endowment eect stem-
ming from loss aversion.
We nd support for these hypotheses in a laboratory setting capturing many of the salient
aspects of the annuity decision. Changing the endowment from a wealth stock to an annuity
payout signicantly increased annuity choice, and regression results indicating a signicant
dierence between no explicit endowment and the lump-sum endowment. Likewise, our
Simultaneous treatments, in which we remove the temporal ordering of outcomes, increased
annuity choice.
26This specication excludes cases with missing HL Scores. Treatment eects are smaller (13% and 13%)
and less precisely estimated when cases with missing Scores are included.
21Our preferred explanation of the mechanism by which our sequential treatment reduced
annuity choice is that the ordering of states induced subjects to eectively overweight early
states. We do admit alternative explanations. For example, a person plausibly experiences
disutility as she waits to nd out if her decision paid o. In the simultaneous sessions,
we resolved uncertainty immediately. In the sequential sessions, the annuity choice meant
approximately 8 rounds of being at risk of having made the wrong choice.27 Of course, the
real-world annuitant faces the same situation.
We take care in extrapolating our results to the real-world retiree's annuity decision,
especially in considering the relative magnitude of these eects. While the laboratory allows
us to cleanly investigate these biases in a context capturing key aspects of the decision, the
laboratory diers from the wild in a number of potentially important ways.
First, we believe ourselves on rm ground describing the retirement-asset allocation deci-
sion as \context rich" (as we would any decision in which mortality plays such a large part).
In the laboratory, we used a neutral context, avoiding language such as retirement, bequests
and death. We did so because we believe context to be so important. In order to focus on
the hypothesized biases of interest, we felt it necessary to control for additional biases that
context may have introduced. Whether the identied biases are mitigated or augmented by
context-dependent biases is left for future research.
Second, we use university students in a relatively low-stakes environment to proxy for
the very high-stakes decision made by retirees. One can naturally ask whether either age
or increased stakes might overcome the identied biases, and we plan to do so in future
work. We note that while those making the annuity decision are older, it is not clear why
older subjects would be less prone to these biases. The annuity decision is largely one shot
with little to no feedback, conditions conducive to the continued existence of biases (Thaler
and Sunstein 2008). Furthermore, while an increase in stakes most surely decreases the
likelihood and extent of less-than-perfectly-rational behavior, there is considerable evidence
that it does not extinguish it.
The control oered by the laboratory environment does oer benets. For example, it
would be dicult to disentangle mistaken survival-probability beliefs from an overweighting
of early events despite correct beliefs. In fact, recent evidence suggests that retirees hold
generally correct beliefs. Hurd and McGarry (2002) and Smith, Taylor and Sloan (2001)
nd that subjective survival probabilities are reasonably close, on average, to life tables and
possibly even more optimistic (Gan, Gong, Hurd and McFadden 2004). Our results suggest a
mechanism by which the perceived unattractiveness of the annuity persists despite accurate
or optimistic survival beliefs.
27We thank Casey Rothschild for this insight.
22We also point out that the risk-ordering bias we investigate (overweighting the relative
probability of near periods) is closely related to discounting, such as hyperbolic discount-
ing, that overweights current-period utility relative to classical models with exponentially
discounted utility. (See Frederick, Loewenstein and O'Donoghue (2002) for an excellent
overview.) In fact, Sheshinski (2007) notes the near equivalence of hyperbolic discounting
and pessimistic survival beliefs. Empirically, it would be dicult to disentangle overweight-
ing the probability of early events from underweighting the utility of later periods. This is
less of an issue in the laboratory. Our experimental design allows us to focus on the former
as subject payment occurs at the same time whether \retirement" is long or short.
Our results suggest a near-future bias, plausibly operating in addition to non-exponential
discounting of future utility. This is important as the eect of hyperbolic discounting on an-
nuity demand is ambiguous. The sophisticated hyperbolic discounter, realizing she will be
present biased in future periods, receives great benets from the annuity's commitment value
(Laibson 1997, Diamond and K oszegi 2003). The na ve hyperbolic discounter, who believes
her present bias only temporary, does benet relative to the exponential discounter from
bringing utility to the current period. However, the dierence between the annuity valu-
ations of the na ve hyperbolic discounter and her exponential counterpart is likely small.
First, the na vely present-biased retiree looks to bump up consumption today as opposed to
today and tomorrow. This is consistent with reducing the amount annuitized (to increase
current-period consumption) as opposed not annuitizing. Second, curvature of the utility
function moderates overall utility gains from reallocating consumption to the current pe-
riod. Our calculations suggest that at plausible (given the context) levels of risk aversion,
the optimal rst-period consumption for the na ve hyperbolic discounter does not greatly
dier from her exponential counterpart, and therefore their relative valuations of even full
annuitization do not greatly dier.28 Taken together, we believe that the assumption of
na ve hyperbolic discounting by an otherwise rational retiree can by itself only explain a
very moderate reduction in the amount annuitized at retirement.
Furthermore, our results might help explain the only partial eectiveness of guarantees
in increasing annuity demand. The combination of a risk-ordering bias and endowment
eect suggests that guarantees may provide an incomplete x for the risk of death shortly
after annuitization. First, while the guarantee mitigates a bequest loss, it does so only
partially. An early death still results in a loss relative to having maintained the wealth stock.
28For example, consider the environment faced by our Appendix A representative retiree with discount-
ing but without a bequest motive. Ms. Exponential discounts future utility at 0:944 t while Mr. Quasi-
Hyperbolic na vely discounts at (:7)0:957 t (Angeletos, Laibson, Repetto, Tobacman and Weinberg 2001).
We calculate the increase wealth necessary to make utility from consumption out of a wealth stock equal to
the utility from the actuarially fair annuity. With  = 2, the exponential discounter needs a 74% increase
while the na ve quasi-hyperbolic discounter needs a 70% increase in assets.
23Second, a guarantee does not cover other losses relative to the initial endowment (such as
loss of consumption control or loss of utility due to an unanticipated medical expense) which
might contribute to a loss-aversion-induced endowment bias. Finally, guarantees might also
have the unintended consequence of increasing focus on early death and contributing to the
overweighting of an early death relative to a long retirement.
Given the annuity paradox and the impending bulge of largely non-annuitized retirees,
a number of policies aimed at increasing annuitization rates have been proposed, with some
receiving careful analysis (Gentry and Rothschild Forthcoming). We believe our results have
implications in this policy arena. Our nding of an endowment bias (stemming from loss
aversion) in payout options suggests that changing the denomination of 401(k) assets from a
lump sum to a claim on a per-period payment might increase annuitization rates. This idea
has been proposed in policy circles and would be a relatively inexpensive and straightforward
option to implement (Iwry and Turner Forthcoming).
The policy implications stemming from the risk-ordering bias we identify are non-obvious
as the risk of an early death naturally precedes the risk of outliving one's assets. However,
Brown et al. (2008a) nd that framing matters in this context, and we share their belief that
a more thorough understanding of the frame through which annuities are sold is needed. We
also wonder whether making a large annuity decision at retirement might exacerbate the
fear of losing one's principal. If so, the retiree may nd more palatable recently introduced
longevity (i.e., delayed payout) annuities (Scott 2007).
While our results provide support for changing the denomination of 401(k) assets and the
eventual success of longevity annuities, the extent to which these innovations (or other policy
or market innovation) will increase demand depends on the interaction of our identied biases
with other context-dependent biases (such as loss of control, especially when paired with
investor over-condence). Addressing these interactions may require taking the experiment
out of the laboratory and into the eld.
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28A Optimal Consumption
A.1 No Endowment Treatments
We assume no in
ation and set the risk-free interest rate equal to zero. We further assume
that a representative retiree enters retirement with a stock of wealth W, and can survive
from 1 to 15 periods with each retirement length equilikely. Under these assumptions, and









each period starting in the rst period (Creighton and Piggott 2006). To simplify matters,
we assume that the retiree consumes her entire annuity payment in each period (ct = y).29
We assume that the retiree who does not annuitize retirement wealth optimally consumes
from her stock of wealth W. The solution to this optimization problem will depend on her
utility function as well as survival probabilities. We assume constant relative risk aversion




1  the per-period utility function of our representative retiree with
 the coecient of relative risk aversion. We implement a rational attraction to maintaining
a stock of wealth (i.e., make reasonable a \hit by a bus" concern) by assuming a bequest




1  , where wt is
wealth remaining as of time t. The retiree thus solves the following:



























29Under our assumptions, reallocating consumption between retirement periods subsequent to annuitiza-
tion decreases utility. However, a retiree with a bequest motive might nd it optimal to not consume her
entire annuity payment.
30Our specication follows the \warm glow" model of Andreoni (1989) rather than an altruistic model
that incorporates children's utility, based on evidence in Kopczuk and Lupton (2007).
29We consider  = 1
3,31  = 0:865,32 and W = 1000. We solve for optimal consumption, and


































Annuity: Payouts A Lump Sum: Payouts A
Annuity: Optimal Utility Lump Sum: Optimal Utility
Figure 5: Representative retiree utility vs. Subject Payouts A.
In Figure 5 we depict the cumulative utility for the retiree who annuitizes and the retiree
who consumes out of the lump sum of assets. We base our Payouts A on these utility
paths, paying $1 per util with the following caveats. In our No Endowment sessions, we
desired to present all payos in multiples of $0.05. We also desired to translate the payos,
particularly those arising from the lump-sum option, into rules easily explainable to subjects.
We therefore oered subjects an annuity payment of $2.00 per period as opposed to $1.88.
We set the lump sum account value equal to $18.00, with round 1 Type-I (consumption)
payment equal to $2.25 in the rst round. The \consumption" payment decreases by $0.15
with each passing round. Type-I payments are subtracted from the account balance, and the
subject choosing the lump-sum payout option receives a Type-II (bequest) payment equal
to 30% of the amount remaining in the account as of the nal round.
As a rst step toward checking the robustness of our results to changes in the relative
values of our subject payments, we slightly alter Payout A. We decrease the Type-I payment
31We choose this level of risk aversion to match median and modal levels of risk aversion exhibited by
experiment subjects. Holt and Laury (2002) nd a median level of risk aversion in the range of 0:15 <  < 0:41
for low-stakes gambles (safe choice pays approximately $1.80) and 0:41 <  < 0:68 for high-stakes gambles
(safe choice pays approximately $36.00).
32We initially choose this high weight on bequest motives for a few reasons. First, we are interested in
decisions where both annuities and the lump-sum distribution are attractive. With  = 1
3, without regard for
a loss of assets due to death (i.e.,  = 0), the expected utility of the optimal consumption of the lump-sum is
only 81% of the actuarially fair annuity's. Furthermore, we desire that both options deliver the same utility
should the subject live for eight periods. This is the case with  = 0:865, and expected utility from the
optimal consumption of the lump sum is 95% of the the actuarially fair annuity's.
30subject to annuitization to $1.75 (akin to moving the annuity away from actuarially fair).
Further, we decrease the annuity weight by decreases the fraction of the account balance
received by the subject from 30% to 20% if the subject choose the lump sum. We depict the
changes in Figure 1.
A.2 Endowment Treatments
In the treatments in which a subject must earn her retirement endowment, we translate
points earned in the Earnings Phase into either per-round payments or account balances in
the Payout Phase.
We start by noting the following about the payos in the No Endowment treatments.
First, for both Payouts A and B, we calculate the amount by which we need to multiply the
per-round annuity payment to recover the round-one lump-sum Type-I payment: A == 2:25
2:00,
and B = 2:25
1:75. Second, letting x1 be the round-one Type-I payment subsequent to choosing
the lump sum, payments decrease each round by  =
x1
15. We use these relationships between
the Annuity and Lump-Sum payouts in the No Endowment treatments in deriving payments
for the endowment treatments.
We assume a linear relationship between points earned in the Earnings Phase and the
stock of wealth brought into retirement by our representative retiree, Wi = points  
.
An actuarially fair annuity pays yi =
Wi
8 , yielding scaled per-period utility (and Type-I




1 1=3. The round-one Type-I payment subsequent to choosing the lump
sum is x1 = u1  , subsequent Type-I payments declining by
x1
15 each round. The subject's
account balance is the summation of Type-I payments over all rounds.
We wanted most earned-endowment subjects to have payouts in line with those faced by
No Endowment subjects. We projected that the median subject would earn 90 points in
the Earnings Phase. For example, setting 
 = 10 results in W = 900, with an actuarially
fair annuity paying 112.5 and scaled utility equal to 1.75, exactly the per-round payout for
Payout B.
In the experiment, 40% of subjects earned between 77 and 104 points, thus placing them
within 10% of the No Endowment payouts, and 56% earned between 71 and 111 points,
placing them with 15% of the No Endowment payouts.
31B Instructions and Payoff Tables
We reproduce below instructions for the annuity-choice portion (Part A) of our experiment.
Instructions for the risk-aversion assessment (Part B), as well as our questionnaire, are
available upon request.
Introduction [All sessions.]
 You are about to participate in a session in which you will make choices in situations
in which the amount of money you receive depends on both your choice and chance.
This is part of a study intended to provide insight into certain features of decision
processes. I encourage you to follow the instructions carefully, as the amount of money
you accumulate will depend on the decisions you make as well as chance. You will be
paid in cash at the end of the experiment.
 During the experiment, I ask that you please do not talk to each other. If you have a
question, please raise your hand and an experimenter will assist you.
 This experiment will consist of 2 parts: Part A and Part B.
Part A Procedures [No Endowment, Simultaneous.]
 For Part A, you will rst choose between the Blue and Orange payout options. Later
in the experiment, you will draw 1 of 15 chips from a bag. Your payout depends on
the chip you draw as well as whether you chose the Blue or Orange payout option.
 You will choose Blue or Orange rst, and I will collect your Choice. You will draw
your chip later in the experiment.
 You will draw 1 chip out of a bag containing 15 chips. Each chip is lettered, with
letters ranging from A through O (the rst 15 letters of the alphabet). Each chip has
one and only one letter, and each letter is on one and only one chip. Prior to drawing,
you may inspect the chips to verify this.
 I have just handed each of you a Choice Sheet.
 For each payout option, the payment you receive for a particular chip has been split
into Type I and Type II payments. Your total payment for the chip you draw from
the bag is the sum of Type I and Type II payments for the payout option you chose.
 The set of blue columns on the Choice Sheet indicates the Type I and II earnings, as
well as your total earnings for each chip, if you choose Blue. The set of orange columns
on the Choice Sheet indicates the Type I and II earnings, as well as your total earnings
for each chip, if you choose Orange.
32 Prior to making your choice, your monitor will display a series of review questions
to test your understanding of these Experiment Instructions. You may refer to the
Experiment Instructions and the Choice Sheet in answering the review questions. You
will be paid $0.10 for each correctly answered question.
 After completing the review questions, you will get as much time as you need to make
your Choice. When you have made your Choice, please circle it in the place indicated
on the Choice Sheet. I will collect the sheets when everyone has made a Choice.
 At the end of the experiment, I will pay you, in cash, your show-up fee and your
earnings from Parts A and B of this experiment.
 Are there any questions?
Part A Overview [Prior to Earnings Phase: Lump Sum, Sequential]
 There are two phases to Part A: the Earning Phase and the Payout Phase.
 You earn points in the Earnings Phase by successfully completing tasks in each of two
4-minute periods. The number of points you earn in the Earnings Phase determines
the the size of your Payout-Phase account. It is from this account that payments are
made to you in the Payout Phase.
 The Payout Phase proceeds in a series of rounds. The number of rounds will be
determined by chance. Your number of Payout-Phase rounds will be as few as 1 and
as many as 15. In each round that your Part A lasts, you receive a payment from
your account. After your nal Part A round, you also receive a fraction of what is
remaining in your account after the per-round payments to you have been subtracted.
Your payment for Part A will depend on total funds you accumulate in your account
during the Earnings Phase, as well as the number of Payout-Phase rounds.
 The more tasks you successfully complete in Earnings Phase, the more
points you generate, the larger the Payout-Phase account and thus the
larger your Part A payment.
Earnings Phase Procedures [Prior to Earnings Phase: Lump Sum, Sequential]
 In each of two 4-minute periods, your computer monitor will present you with a series
of tasks. For each task, your monitor rst presents you with 5 letters. After you click
the OK button, your monitor will present you with a series of 3 letters. You are then
asked to click Yes if all of the new 3 letters were in the original 5 letters, and No if
any the new 3 letters were not in the original 5.
33 If your response is correct, your monitor will immediately present you with the next
set of 5 letters. If your response is incorrect, your computer monitor will present a
screen indicating that your response is incorrect. After clicking the OK button, your
monitor will then present you with the next set of 5 letters.
 The computer will keep track of your correct and incorrect responses. The number of
points you earn in an Earnings Period is the number of correct responses minus the
number of incorrect responses in the 4-minute period. The number of points you earn
in the Earnings Phase is the sum of the points you earn in the two Earnings periods.
 The Points Table indicates for each number of total points you accumulate in the
Earnings Phase the funds in your account in the Payout Phase.
 The Earnings Phase starts with a short practice round. The purpose of the practice
round is to give you an opportunity to familiarize yourself with the computer interface.
You do not accumulate points in the practice round.
Payout Phase Procedures [Prior to Earnings Phase: Lump Sum, Sequential]
 The number of points you earn in the Earnings Phase determines the value of your
Payout-Phase account.
 Later in the experiment, I will call you up individually to determine your number of
Payout-Phase rounds.
 You receive a payment from your Payout-Phase account each round. Your per-round
payments are subtracted from your account. Your per-round payment decreases with
each round.
 In each round, I present you with a bag of marbles. If you draw a green marble, you
proceed to the next round and receive the per-round payment for that next round. If
you do not draw a green marble, you do not proceed to the next round and your Part
A is over. After your nal round, you receive 20% of what remains in your account
after your per-round payments have been subtracted.
 Note that you will receive all of the funds in your Payout-Phase account only if your
Payout Phase lasts all 15 rounds.
 You start in round 1 and therefore collect the round 1 per-round payment. I will
present you with a bag with 15 marbles, 14 of which are green. (If you wish, you may
count the marbles in the bag.)
34 If you select a green marble, you move on to round 2 and thus collect the round-2
per-round payment. I would then present you the same bag of marbles, which would
now contain 14 marbles, 13 of which are green. Again, if you draw any one the green
marbles, you move on to round 3, and collect your per-round payment for round 3.
The bag would now contain 13 marbles, 12 of which are green.
 The rounds proceed until you fail to draw a green marble, at which point your Part
A ends. You receive the per-round payment for each Payout-Phase round you last, as
well as 20% of what remains in your account after the per-round payments have been
subtracted.
 At the end of the experiment, I will pay you, in cash, your show-up fee and your
earnings from Parts A and B of this experiment.
 Are there any questions?
[After Earnings Phase: Lump Sum, Sequential]
 I am now going to oer you an alternate payout schedule for the Payout Phase. I
encourage you to listen carefully as you will be asked to choose between the original
and alternate schedules.
 Depending on the number of Payout-Phase rounds, sometimes the original payout
schedule will result in higher payouts, and sometimes the alternate payout schedule
will result in higher payouts.
 Based on your points and thus the Payout-Phase account you earned, we have cal-
culated your per-round payment for each Payout-Phase round. These are the Type-I
payments on the Choice Sheet for the original schedule. We have also calculated 20% of
the remaining account balance after per-round payments have been subtracted. These
are the Type-II payments on the Choice Sheet for the original schedule.
 In the alternate payout schedule, there are also per-round Type-I payments, although
unlike the original payout schedule these payments are equal in each round. You receive
these Type-I payments for each round you last.
 If you choose the alternate payout schedule, in your nal round, you do not receive a
Type-II payment.
 The set of blue columns on the Choice Sheet indicates the alternate payout schedule.
It indicates the Type-I payment for each round you last. The set of orange columns on
35the Choice Sheet indicates the Type-I and Type-II payments for the original payout
schedule. Recall that you receive the the Type-I payment for each round, and receive
only one Type-II payment: the Type-II payment associated with your nal round. The
last column of each color indicates your total Part-A earnings if you chose that option
and your game lasts exactly a given number of rounds.
 The last set of columns indicates for each round the number of green marbles in the
bag for that round as well as the total number of marbles. The nal column indicates
for each round the chance of drawing a green marble and thus proceeding to the next
round.
 Prior to making your choice, your monitor will display a series of review questions
to test your understanding of these Experiment Instructions. You may refer to the
Experiment Instructions and the Choice Sheet in answering the review questions. You
will be paid $0.10 for each correctly answered question.
 After completing the review questions, you will get as much time as you need to make
your Choice. When you have made your Choice, please circle it in the place indicated
on the Choice Sheet. I will collect the sheets when everyone has made a Choice.
 At the end of the experiment, I will pay you, in cash, your show-up fee and your
earnings from Parts A and B of this experiment.
 Are there any questions?
B.1 Payo Tables in No Endowment Treatments
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